Trade Secrets Enforceability by State: The 2026 50-State Reference

Trade secrets by state: the short answer

Trade secret law is nearly uniform on paper. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia enacted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). New York has no trade secrets statute and applies common law. North Carolina has its own statute, the Trade Secrets Protection Act. The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) counts the UTSA in 52 jurisdictions (49 states, D.C., Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands); because New York is the only state with no UTSA-style act, that count includes North Carolina, whose statute uses its own words. The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. § 1836, has run alongside state law since May 11, 2016 and does not preempt it (§ 1838), so a complaint usually pleads both.

Reviewed and corrected on 6 October 2026. This is general information, not legal advice; check the cited statute or opinion before relying on it.

Three things vary. The limitation period is three years from discovery in most states, two in Alabama, four in Maine, Nebraska, Ohio and Wyoming, five in Georgia, Illinois and Missouri, and six in Vermont. Courts split on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, which lets an employer argue that a new job will unavoidably expose its secrets. And the DTSA itself limits injunctions that keep a person out of a job. The state table below gives each state's act, its limitation period and what we could verify about inevitable disclosure.

Official text, as of 6 October 2026

Two provisions anchor everything else: the federal definition of a trade secret, and one state's version of the uniform limitation rule. Both were read on the official sites on 6 October 2026.

Federal definition: 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), uscode.house.gov. The information qualifies if

"the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and ... the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known"

The full text goes on to require that the information not be "readily ascertainable through proper means" by another person who can obtain economic value from it.

State UTSA section: Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6, leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.

"An action for misappropriation must be brought within three years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered."

California's section adds that a continuing misappropriation is a single claim. Alabama, North Carolina and Pennsylvania did not enact that sentence, and several states use a different number of years (see the limitation list above).

What changed in 2026: Nothing in either section above. The U.S. Code source notes list the May 11, 2016 act as the latest amendment to §§ 1836, 1838 and 1839, and California's section still carries only its 1984 history line. Elsewhere, Washington signed a noncompete ban in March 2026 that takes effect June 30, 2027, bills to give New York a UTSA are pending, and the ULC is redrafting the UTSA (all three are covered below).

The two questions that decide a trade-secret matter

Picture a general counsel whose VP of engineering has just left for a direct competitor. This is a hypothetical, built to show the order in which the questions arise. The GC wants to know two things. Which state's trade secret act governs the claim, and can she get an order that keeps the VP out of the new job without proving he took anything?

The first question turns on the state's statute and its version of the UTSA. The second turns on whether that state's courts accept inevitable disclosure, and on the DTSA's own limit on injunctions that restrain employment. The first answer is nearly the same everywhere. The second splits the country.

TL;DR

• Forty-eight states and D.C. enacted a version of the UTSA. New York uses common law (Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993)). North Carolina has its own statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-152 to 66-157. States adopted either the 1979 or the 1985 version, and many changed the text.
• The DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 et seq., effective May 11, 2016, adds a federal claim that runs beside state law. Its injunction clause says any condition on employment must rest on "evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows."
• Limitation periods: three years in most states and under the DTSA; two in Alabama; four in Maine, Nebraska, Ohio and Wyoming; five in Georgia, Illinois and Missouri; six in Vermont.
• Inevitable disclosure is the widest split. Illinois, Arkansas, Ohio and New Jersey appellate courts have applied it in some form, and Pennsylvania courts enjoin where disclosure is likely. Maryland and California reject it. Federal courts in New York, Minnesota, Missouri and Florida declined to apply it on the facts, and Texas appellate courts have not expressly adopted it. For most other states we could not verify a controlling answer.
• Customer lists, reasonable-secrecy measures, and damages and fees also vary, but mostly by statute text and by the facts of the case.

Part of our all-50-states legal reference series.

The federal baseline: DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836

The DTSA, enacted on May 11, 2016, created a federal civil action for misappropriation of a trade secret "related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). District courts have original jurisdiction (§ 1836(c)), so a plaintiff does not need diversity.

The Act preserves state-law claims: § 1838 says it does not "preempt or displace any other remedies" under federal or state law. That is why the standard complaint pleads the DTSA and the state UTSA claim together. It is also all that sections 1836 and 1838 say on the point. Neither contains a venue or choice-of-law rule, so pleading the DTSA does not change which state's law governs the state claim.

The remedies are an injunction, damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment (or a reasonable royalty), exemplary damages of up to twice the damages for willful and malicious misappropriation, and attorney fees for bad-faith claims, bad-faith injunction motions, or willful and malicious misappropriation (§ 1836(b)(3)). A seizure order is available only "upon ex parte application but only in extraordinary circumstances" (§ 1836(b)(2)(A)(i)).

The injunction clause matters most for employee-mobility cases. A court may enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation, but the order may not "prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and ... conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows." It also may not "conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business." § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I)-(II). That language sits uneasily with using a DTSA claim as an inevitable-disclosure shortcut.

The DTSA's limitation period is three years from when the misappropriation is discovered or should have been discovered, and a continuing misappropriation is a single claim (§ 1836(d)). Alabama's two years is the only state period shorter than that.

The UTSA framework adopted by 48 states

The ULC published the UTSA in 1979 and amended it in 1985. It has not been updated since: the ULC said in July 2025 that it "has not been updated for 40 years" when it authorized a drafting committee. As Sid Leach of Snell & Wilmer put it in a 2015 survey, "there is not a single uniform act -- there are two." The ULC's adoption table lists Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Rhode Island and Washington as 1979-text states, and Leach found that Illinois and Michigan used language from both versions.

The core is the same in nearly every state.

Definition of trade secret. Information that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means, and that is the subject of reasonable efforts to keep it secret. Both prongs must be met.

Misappropriation. Acquiring a secret by improper means, or disclosing or using it without consent after improper acquisition or in breach of a duty of confidence. "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, and electronic espionage. Reverse engineering and independent derivation are not improper means (Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(a)).

Remedies. Injunction; damages for actual loss plus unjust enrichment not counted in actual loss, or a reasonable royalty; exemplary damages up to twice the award for willful and malicious misappropriation; and attorney fees for bad-faith claims, bad-faith injunction motions, or willful and malicious misappropriation (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426.3, 3426.4; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, §§ 42B, 42C). Fee-shifting was already in the 1979 text: California is a 1979-text state and § 3426.4 provides it.

Limitation period. Three years from discovery, with a continuing misappropriation treated as a single claim.

States departed from that text in places. Alabama's act has a different structure, a two-year period and no continuing-misappropriation sentence (Ala. Code § 8-27-5). Vermont gives six years and requires costs and fees for a substantially prevailing party (12 V.S.A. § 523; 9 V.S.A. § 4603). Georgia and Tennessee wrote their own rules for continuing misappropriation by more than one person. North Carolina and Pennsylvania omit the continuing-misappropriation sentence. Massachusetts, which enacted its act in 2018, lists "customer list" and "business strategy" in the definition and covers information that is "specified or specifiable" (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42(4)). Wisconsin keeps its limitation period in Wis. Stat. § 893.51(2) rather than in the act itself.

New York and North Carolina

New York. New York never adopted the UTSA. Trade-secret misappropriation is a common-law claim, and the Court of Appeals applies the Restatement of Torts definition in Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993). The factors are: (1) how widely the information is known outside the business, (2) how widely it is known inside it, (3) the measures taken to guard it, (4) its value to the business and competitors, (5) the effort or money spent developing it, and (6) how easily others could properly acquire or duplicate it.

The limitation question is open in our review. CPLR 214 sets three years for injury to property and CPLR 213 sets six years for contract actions and for actions with no other prescribed period. We did not find a decision that settles which one governs a trade-secret claim, so the table says that.

Two bills would change the picture. S5336 (Sanders, introduced February 20, 2025) and A8105 (Vanel, introduced April 30, 2025) would add a Uniform Trade Secrets Act to the General Business Law with a three-year limitation period. Both were in the Judiciary committees at the last status we could read.

North Carolina. North Carolina enacted its own Trade Secrets Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-152 to 66-157, in 1981. Section 66-152(3) defines a trade secret as business or technical information that "derives independent actual or potential commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use" and "is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." The limitation period is three years (§ 66-157), with no continuing-misappropriation sentence. A violation can also support an unfair-practices claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169 (1992)).

Inevitable disclosure: where courts have actually ruled

The doctrine says a court may keep an employee out of a competitor's job because the employee cannot help using the old employer's secrets. We read the leading opinions below. Every state not named here is marked "not verified" in the table.

Courts that apply it in some form.

• Illinois. In PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit held that under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act "a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff's trade secrets." The trial court had also doubted the employee's candor. An Illinois appellate court agreed in Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (2000).
• Arkansas. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed an injunction on evidence "more than sufficient to show a threatened or inevitable misappropriation" (Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 336 Ark. 143, 987 S.W.2d 642 (1999)).
• New Jersey. The Appellate Division upheld preliminary relief on a "sufficient likelihood of 'inevitable disclosure'" (Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1987)).
• Ohio. An Ohio appellate court reversed the denial of an injunction where an employee with detailed knowledge took a substantially similar job with a competitor (Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 140 Ohio App. 3d 260 (2000)).
• Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania courts enjoin employment that is "likely to result in the disclosure" of a former employer's secrets (Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa. Super. 405 (1982)). In Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit described the test the trial court used as resting on likely, not inevitable, disclosure.

Courts that reject, decline or have not adopted it.

• California rejects it: "we reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine" (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002)), citing Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 and California's policy favoring employee mobility.
• Maryland rejects it. The Court of Appeals held the theory "does not apply in Maryland" and vacated an injunction built on it (LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 849 A.2d 451 (2004)).
• Michigan. The Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that threatened misappropriation could cover inevitable disclosure and still required more than "generalized trade secrets and a competitor's employment of the party's former employee" (CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 251 Mich. App. 125 (2002)).
• New York. A federal court called the doctrine something that "treads an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory" and said that, absent evidence of actual misappropriation, it should be applied "in only the rarest of cases" (EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
• North Carolina. The Court of Appeals found it "need not reach" whether to adopt the doctrine because it would not be applied as the plaintiff urged (Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 157 N.C. App. 462 (2003)).
• Texas. The Houston court of appeals found "no Texas case expressly adopting" it and did not decide whether to adopt it, because the employer would lose even under the doctrine (Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003)). The court described Dallas decisions as applying "what might be viewed as a modified version" of it, under which an injunction fits when it is probable the former employee will use the confidential information. The Texas statute bars an injunction that prohibits an employee from using general knowledge, skill and experience (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.003(a)).
• Federal courts in Minnesota, Missouri and Florida declined to apply it on the facts: IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98 (D. Minn. 1992) (the Eighth Circuit "has neither accepted nor rejected" the doctrine); H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("Florida has not had an opportunity to discuss inevitable disclosure").

Customer lists, secrecy measures, damages and fees

Customer lists. In California, Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514 (1997), held a customer list was a UTSA trade secret and quoted the rule that protected information "may be in the employee's memory." The court rejected the idea that an employee's relationship with customers frees the employee to use the list. In New York, Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303 (1976), refused to enforce a covenant where the employer had shown no trade secret and "failed to establish a studied copying of a customer list." Massachusetts lists "customer list" in its statutory definition.

Reasonable secrecy. Every state's definition asks for reasonable efforts. North Carolina's words are "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances," and Massachusetts adds that the efforts "may include reasonable notice" (ch. 93, § 42(4)(ii)). In MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Va. 2004), a bench trial, the court found the plaintiff took reasonable steps: physical and software security, and confidentiality terms in employee contracts and the handbook.

Damages and fees. The standard rule is exemplary damages up to twice the award for willful and malicious misappropriation, and fees for bad faith or willful and malicious misappropriation. Connecticut allows punitive damages up to twice the award plus fees for willful and malicious misappropriation but limits fees otherwise to bad-faith claims and motions (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-53, 35-54). Massachusetts lets a court award fees to the prevailing party if a claim "is made or defended in bad faith" (ch. 93, § 42C). Vermont requires fees for a substantially prevailing party. For scale, a Kentucky-act verdict in Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 53 F.4th 368 (6th Cir. 2022), ended in a judgment of about $6.75 million, including $1,000,000 in exemplary damages and $3,254,303.50 in fees. It was not a DTSA claim. The court rejected the argument that a plaintiff must prove the defendant acquired and used every element of a combination trade secret.

The 50-state table

Each row gives the act, the limitation period (read from the statute) and what we could verify about inevitable disclosure. "Not verified" means we found no controlling decision either way in our October 2026 review and make no claim. The label does not mean the question is unsettled. Check the state's appellate decisions before filing.

• Alabama. Alabama Trade Secrets Act (Ala. Code §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6). SOL two years from discovery, with no continuing-misappropriation sentence (§ 8-27-5). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1991), addressed claims under the Act and the common law over customer and vendor lists.
• Alaska. UTSA (Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.945). SOL three years (§ 45.50.925). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Arizona. UTSA (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-401 to 44-407). SOL three years (§ 44-406). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Arkansas. UTSA (Ark. Code §§ 4-75-601 to 4-75-607). SOL three years (§ 4-75-603). Inevitable disclosure: the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed an injunction on evidence "more than sufficient to show a threatened or inevitable misappropriation" (Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 336 Ark. 143, 987 S.W.2d 642 (1999)).
• California. UTSA (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426 to 3426.11). SOL three years (§ 3426.6). Inevitable disclosure: rejected (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002)). Customer lists: Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514 (1997), held a customer list was a UTSA trade secret and rejected the argument that an employee's memory of it frees the employee to use it.
• Colorado. UTSA (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-110). SOL three years (§ 7-74-107). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Colorado voids most noncompetes, but § 8-2-113(2)(b) allows one for a highly compensated worker if it protects trade secrets and is no broader than reasonably necessary.
• Connecticut. UTSA, 1979 text (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-50 to 35-58). SOL three years (§ 35-56). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 251 Conn. 59 (1999), affirmed an injunction and punitive damages for misappropriating a trade secret.
• Delaware. UTSA (6 Del. C. §§ 2001 to 2009). SOL three years (§ 2006). Inevitable disclosure: left open by the Court of Chancery in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 533, 200 A.2d 428 (1964); later authority not verified.
• District of Columbia. UTSA (D.C. Code §§ 36-401 to 36-410). SOL three years (§ 36-406). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Florida. UTSA (Fla. Stat. §§ 688.001 to 688.009). SOL three years (§ 688.007). Inevitable disclosure: in 2001 a federal court noted that "Florida has not had an opportunity to discuss inevitable disclosure" and denied a preliminary injunction (Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001)); later authority not verified.
• Georgia. UTSA (O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-767). SOL five years (§ 10-1-766). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553 (1998), affirmed a permanent injunction protecting a logistics system as a trade secret.
• Hawaii. UTSA (Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 482B-1 to 482B-9). SOL three years (§ 482B-7). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Idaho. UTSA (Idaho Code §§ 48-801 to 48-807). SOL three years (§ 48-805). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Illinois. UTSA (765 ILCS 1065/1 to 1065/9). SOL five years (765 ILCS 1065/7). Inevitable disclosure: accepted as a way to show threatened misappropriation (PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), applying Illinois law; Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (2000)).
• Indiana. UTSA, 1979 text (Ind. Code §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8). SOL three years (§ 24-2-3-7). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Iowa. UTSA (Iowa Code §§ 550.1 to 550.8). SOL three years (§ 550.8). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Kansas. UTSA (Kan. Stat. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330). SOL three years (§ 60-3325). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Kentucky. UTSA (Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 365.880 to 365.900). SOL three years (§ 365.890). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Louisiana. UTSA, 1979 text (La. Rev. Stat. §§ 51:1431 to 51:1439). SOL three years (§ 51:1436). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Maine. UTSA (10 M.R.S. §§ 1541 to 1548). SOL four years (§ 1547). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Maryland. UTSA (Md. Code, Com. Law §§ 11-1201 to 11-1209). SOL three years (§ 11-1206). Inevitable disclosure: rejected. The Maryland Court of Appeals held the theory "does not apply in Maryland" and vacated an injunction that rested on it (LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 849 A.2d 451 (2004)).
• Massachusetts. Massachusetts enacted its own version of the UTSA in 2018 (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, §§ 42 to 42G; St. 2018, c. 228). SOL three years (§ 42E). The definition lists customer lists (§ 42(4)), and § 42A(a) allows an injunction against "actual or threatened misappropriation" on principles of equity. Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Michigan. UTSA (Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 445.1901 to 445.1910). SOL three years (§ 445.1907). Inevitable disclosure: the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that threatened misappropriation could cover it and held the plaintiff must show more than generalized trade secrets and a competitor's hiring of an employee who knows them (CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 251 Mich. App. 125 (2002)).
• Minnesota. UTSA (Minn. Stat. §§ 325C.01 to 325C.08). SOL three years (§ 325C.06). Inevitable disclosure: a federal court denied a preliminary injunction for lack of a "high degree of probability of inevitable disclosure" and noted the Eighth Circuit "has neither accepted nor rejected" the doctrine (IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98 (D. Minn. 1992)); state-court authority not verified.
• Mississippi. UTSA (Miss. Code §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19). SOL three years (§ 75-26-13). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Missouri. UTSA (Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 417.450 to 417.467). SOL five years (§ 417.461). Inevitable disclosure: a federal court declined to find threatened misappropriation and called PepsiCo inapposite (H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000)); Missouri appellate authority not verified.
• Montana. UTSA (Mont. Code §§ 30-14-401 to 30-14-409). SOL three years (§ 30-14-407). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Nebraska. UTSA (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-501 to 87-507). SOL four years (§ 87-506). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Nevada. UTSA (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 600A.010 to 600A.100). SOL three years (§ 600A.080). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 999 P.2d 351 (2000), addressed damages and punitive damages under the Nevada act.
• New Hampshire. UTSA (N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 350-B:1 to 350-B:9). SOL three years (§ 350-B:6). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• New Jersey. UTSA (N.J. Stat. §§ 56:15-1 to 56:15-9, P.L. 2011, c. 161, enacted 2012). SOL three years (§ 56:15-8). Inevitable disclosure: the Appellate Division upheld preliminary relief on a "sufficient likelihood of 'inevitable disclosure'" before the statute (Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1987)); later authority not verified.
• New Mexico. UTSA (N.M. Stat. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7). SOL three years (§ 57-3A-7). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• New York. No UTSA; trade-secret claims are common law, using the Restatement factors adopted in Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993). Limitation period: not verified for trade-secret claims; CPLR 214 sets three years for injury to property and CPLR 213 sets six years for contract. Inevitable disclosure: a federal court called the doctrine disfavored and said that, absent evidence of actual misappropriation, it should be applied "in only the rarest of cases" (EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Bills to enact a UTSA (S5336, A8105) were in committee in 2025-26.
• North Carolina. Not a UTSA state. Trade Secrets Protection Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-152 to 66-157). SOL three years (§ 66-157). Inevitable disclosure: the Court of Appeals declined to reach whether to adopt it and refused to apply it as urged (Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 157 N.C. App. 462 (2003)).
• North Dakota. UTSA (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-08). SOL three years (§ 47-25.1-06). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Ohio. UTSA (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1333.61 to 1333.69). SOL four years (§ 1333.66). Inevitable disclosure: an Ohio appellate court reversed the denial of an injunction on facts showing an employee with detailed knowledge in a substantially similar competing job (Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 140 Ohio App. 3d 260 (2000)).
• Oklahoma. UTSA (Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §§ 85 to 94). SOL three years (tit. 78, § 91). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 217 voids contracts restraining a lawful profession, trade or business except as the statutes provide.
• Oregon. UTSA (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 646.461 to 646.475). SOL three years (§ 646.471). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Pennsylvania. UTSA (12 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5301 to 5308, Act 14 of 2004). SOL three years (§ 5307). Inevitable disclosure: courts may enjoin employment that is likely to result in disclosure of a former employer's secrets (Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa. Super. 405 (1982); Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010)).
• Rhode Island. UTSA, 1979 text (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11). SOL three years (§ 6-41-6). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• South Carolina. UTSA (S.C. Code §§ 39-8-10 to 39-8-130). SOL three years (§ 39-8-70). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• South Dakota. UTSA (S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-29-1 to 37-29-11). SOL three years (§ 37-29-6). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Tennessee. UTSA (Tenn. Code §§ 47-25-1701 to 47-25-1709). SOL three years (§ 47-25-1707). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Texas. Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 134A.001 to 134A.008, effective Sept. 1, 2013). SOL three years (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.010). Inevitable disclosure: not expressly adopted. The Houston court of appeals found "no Texas case expressly adopting" it and did not decide whether to adopt it (Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003)); it described Dallas decisions as a "modified version" that asks whether use of the information is probable. Section 134A.003(a) bars an injunction that prohibits an employee from using general knowledge, skill and experience.
• Utah. UTSA (Utah Code §§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9). SOL three years (§ 13-24-7). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Vermont. UTSA (9 V.S.A. §§ 4601 to 4609). SOL six years from discovery (12 V.S.A. § 523). Vermont requires costs and fees for a substantially prevailing party and allows punitive damages for malicious misappropriation (9 V.S.A. § 4603). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Virginia. UTSA (Va. Code §§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343). SOL three years (§ 59.1-340). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Washington. UTSA (Rev. Code Wash. §§ 19.108.010 to 19.108.930). SOL three years (§ 19.108.060). Inevitable disclosure: not verified. Washington signed ESHB 1155 (Laws of 2026, ch. 149) on March 23, 2026. From June 30, 2027 all noncompetition covenants are void and unenforceable, but the act's definition leaves out confidentiality agreements and covenants prohibiting use or disclosure of trade secrets or inventions, and it says it does not amend chapter 19.108 RCW.
• West Virginia. UTSA (W. Va. Code §§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10). SOL three years (§ 47-22-6). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Wisconsin. UTSA (Wis. Stat. § 134.90). SOL three years (§ 893.51(2)). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.
• Wyoming. UTSA (Wyo. Stat. §§ 40-24-101 to 40-24-110). SOL four years (§ 40-24-106). Inevitable disclosure: not verified.

What changed in 2025 and 2026

• ULC rewrite. In July 2025 the Uniform Law Commission authorized a drafting committee to update the UTSA text and comments. Nothing changes in a state until it enacts the result.
• New York. S5336 and A8105 would enact a UTSA with a three-year limitation period. Both were in committee.
• Washington. Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1155 (Laws of 2026, ch. 149), signed March 23, 2026, makes all noncompetition covenants void and unenforceable from June 30, 2027. We read the enrolled text: its definition of "noncompetition covenant" excludes nonsolicitation agreements, confidentiality agreements and "a covenant prohibiting use or disclosure of trade secrets or inventions," and amended RCW 49.62.090 says the chapter "does not amend or modify chapter 19.108 RCW," the trade secrets act. A trade-secret claim stays available.
• Colorado. C.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(b), as published through fall 2025, voids most noncompetes but allows one for a highly compensated worker if it protects trade secrets and is no broader than reasonably necessary.
• Federal. We found no amendment to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836, 1838 or 1839 after May 11, 2016.

How the state differences change case strategy

The map matters because it changes three decisions in the first two weeks.

What the complaint rests on. Where a court accepts inevitable disclosure (Illinois, Arkansas, Ohio, New Jersey), a motion can lead with the new job's overlap with the secrets, backed by evidence of the employee's access. Where it does not (California, Maryland), the motion needs evidence of actual or threatened misuse: download logs, copied files, solicitation. The DTSA's injunction clause requires the same kind of evidence in every federal case. In the states we could not verify, plead actual or threatened misappropriation first and inevitable disclosure second.

Choice of forum. The DTSA gives federal jurisdiction. It does not choose the governing state law. Compare the rows for the states a case could touch before choosing where to file.

Offboarding records. Every statute asks for reasonable efforts, and the DTSA asks for "reasonable measures." In MicroStrategy the court credited what the employer actually had in place, which is why the records matter.

Drafting checklist: protecting trade secrets across jurisdictions

The reasonable-secrecy requirement in § 1839(3)(A) and in the state acts is where an employer can help itself before any dispute.

1. Written information-classification policy. Define the tiers of confidential information, what each tier covers, and what access controls apply. Review it annually.
2. Confidentiality marking. Headers, footers, watermarks and system tags on the information itself.
3. Access controls tied to job function. Least-privilege access, with a log of who opened what and when.
4. NDAs and employment agreements with the DTSA immunity notice. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3) requires the notice in agreements with employees, contractors and consultants. Without it the employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under the DTSA against that person.
5. Exit certification. A signed statement at departure listing the categories of information returned and confirming no copies were kept.
6. Vendor agreements. Confidentiality terms and audit rights for manufacturing partners, IT vendors and contractors who see the secrets. A disclosure without confidentiality terms can defeat the reasonable-efforts requirement.
7. A short rationale in the policy. Two sentences on what the company protects and why the measures fit its size and industry.

On the litigation side, identify the secret early. Some states require it by statute: Massachusetts requires a party to plead with "reasonable particularity" and identify the trade secret before discovery (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42D(b)).

FAQ

How many states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act?

Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia enacted a version of the UTSA. The Uniform Law Commission counts 52 jurisdictions: 49 states, D.C., Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. That count includes North Carolina, whose 1981 act uses its own wording. New York has no UTSA-style statute.

Which states have not adopted the UTSA?

New York applies common law under Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993), with the Restatement of Torts factors. North Carolina has its own Trade Secrets Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-152 to 66-157, enacted in 1981. Bills to enact a UTSA in New York (S5336, A8105) were in committee in 2025-26.

Does federal trade secret law replace state trade secret law?

No. The DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836, creates a federal civil action that runs alongside state law, and § 1838 says it does not preempt or displace other remedies. A complaint usually pleads both. The DTSA contains no choice-of-law rule, so the state claim is governed by the state law the court would otherwise apply.

What is the statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation?

Three years from discovery in most UTSA states and under the DTSA (§ 1836(d)). Alabama gives two years. Maine, Nebraska, Ohio and Wyoming give four. Georgia, Illinois and Missouri give five. Vermont gives six (12 V.S.A. § 523). New York's period for a trade-secret claim was not verified in our review.

What is the inevitable disclosure doctrine and which states accept it?

It lets a court enjoin a former employee from a new job on the theory that the employee cannot help using the old employer's secrets. Illinois (PepsiCo; Strata Marketing), Arkansas (Cardinal Freight), Ohio (Stoneham) and New Jersey (National Starch) appellate courts have applied it in some form, and Pennsylvania courts enjoin where disclosure is likely. California (Whyte) and Maryland (LeJeune) reject it. A federal court in New York called it disfavored, to be applied only in the rarest of cases when there is no evidence of actual misappropriation (EarthWeb). Texas appellate courts have not expressly adopted it. For most other states, the question is not verified here. The DTSA itself says an order may not prevent employment and must rest on evidence of threatened misappropriation, "not merely on the information the person knows."

Does California recognize trade secret protection?

Yes. California adopted the UTSA at Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426 to 3426.11. It also voids noncompetes under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 and rejects inevitable disclosure, so a trade secret claim there needs evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation.

Are customer lists protected as trade secrets?

They can be. Morlife v. Perry (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) protected a customer list under the UTSA even though the former employees knew it from memory. In New York, Reed, Roberts v. Strauman (N.Y. 1976) refused to enforce a covenant where the employer showed no trade secret and no "studied copying of a customer list." Massachusetts lists "customer list" in its statutory definition. Whether a given list qualifies depends on the state's definition and on the proof of secrecy.

What counts as "reasonable efforts" to keep a trade secret?

Every state's statute requires reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, and the DTSA requires "reasonable measures." Courts decide it on the facts. In MicroStrategy v. Business Objects (E.D. Va. 2004) the court credited physical and software security and confidentiality terms in employee contracts and the handbook.

Closing

Forty-eight states and D.C. enacted a version of the UTSA, New York and North Carolina did not, and the federal DTSA has overlaid all of them since 2016. The statutes are close to uniform. The inevitable-disclosure case law is not: some appellate courts apply it, some reject it, and for most states we could not confirm either. Two answers come first in any matter: which state's act and limitation period apply, and whether that state's courts will enjoin a new job without proof of misuse. The first is in the statute. The second is in the appellate decisions, and the DTSA's own text asks for evidence of threatened misappropriation either way.

For related state-by-state coverage, see Non-Compete Enforceability by State: A 2026 Map, NDA Enforceability by State, Statute of Limitations by State, and Liquidated Damages Enforceability by State.

For the US statutes, regulations and court rules these laws sit in, see the US primary law API.

Arshita Anand

Co-Founder & CEO · Attorney

Arshita leads product and strategy at Vaquill AI, the US primary law data API. As an attorney, she decides which law we carry, how each section is sourced and cited, and what legal AI and compliance teams need from the data.