Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act in 2026: Drafting Non-Competes That Survive

Short answer: yes, non-competes are enforceable in Georgia, but a post-employment non-compete cannot be enforced against an employee who does none of the four things listed in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a), it must be reasonable in time, geographic area and scope of activities, and a former employee's restraint of two years or less is presumed reasonable under § 13-8-57(b). The Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 et seq., took effect May 11, 2011. Courts may modify a non-compliant covenant under §§ 13-8-53(d) and 13-8-54(b), but they do not have to, and recent appellate decisions (Wimmer, Herzig and Falcon Ridge) show how that plays out.

Reviewed and corrected on 6 October 2026. This is general information, not legal advice; check the cited statute or opinion before relying on it.

Official text, as of 6 October 2026

Citation: O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).

Text: Enforcement of post-employment restraints "shall not be permitted against any employee who does not, in the course of his or her employment" do one of four things, the last being "(4) Perform the duties of a key employee or of a professional."

Source: Justia's copy of the 2025 Code of Georgia, § 13-8-53, read on 6 October 2026. The State of Georgia makes the Official Code of Georgia Annotated free to read online through LexisNexis, but that site would not load its text for us, so we read Justia's copy and cross-checked it against Georgia Commons. We did not compare it line by line with the State's own site; check the official site before relying on the wording.

What changed in 2026: We found no amendment to §§ 13-8-50 through 13-8-59, but the Code copies we read run only through the 2025 session, so we did not check 2026 Acts line by line. The history shown for § 13-8-53 lists only the 2011 act and a 2012 clean-up act. In 2026 the Court of Appeals decided Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, 378 Ga. App. 259 (Jan. 13, 2026), on severing unenforceable covenants, and the FTC's non-compete rule was removed from the federal regulations effective February 12, 2026.

TL;DR

• The Act applies to restrictive covenants, effective May 11, 2011. It covers §§ 13-8-50 through 13-8-59. We did not re-read the session law's rules on which older contracts it reaches, so check that for a pre-2011 agreement.
• Four duty tests gate the non-compete. Under § 13-8-53(a), a post-employment non-compete cannot be enforced against an employee who does not, in the course of the job, (1) customarily and regularly solicit customers or prospects for the employer; (2) customarily and regularly make sales or obtain orders or contracts for products or services to be performed by others; (3) manage the enterprise or a recognized department, direct the work of two or more employees, and have hire-or-fire authority or particular weight given to personnel recommendations; or (4) perform the duties of a key employee or of a professional. The statute does not require the covenant to recite which test applies, and it sets no salary threshold.
• Duration is presumed by relationship. Under § 13-8-57, for a former employee two years or less is presumed reasonable and more than two is presumed unreasonable. For a distributor, dealer, franchisee, lessee or trademark licensee the line is three years. For the owner or seller of a business it is the longer of five years or the period during which sale payments are made. All are rebuttable.
• Modification is discretionary. A court "may modify" a non-compliant restraint (§ 13-8-54(b)) but cannot make it more restrictive of the employee than the parties wrote it (§ 13-8-53(d)). In All States AG Parts, LLC v. Herzig (Ga. Ct. App. 2025), a clause barring work for a competitor "in any capacity" was held overbroad, and the court found no abuse of discretion in refusing to rewrite it.
• Geography does not have to be stated. North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer, 319 Ga. 641 (2024), held that a covenant need not contain an express geographic term to satisfy § 13-8-53(a). Falcon Ridge, Inc. v. Leon, 376 Ga. App. 554 (2025), applied that logic to a non-recruitment clause, held that a geographic limit is not necessarily required for a customer non-solicit under § 13-8-53(b), and upheld the description of prohibited activities in a competitor clause as a good faith estimate under § 13-8-53(c).

Part of our state law reference series.

The statutory framework: §§ 13-8-50 to 13-8-59

The Act sits in Article 4 of Chapter 8 of Title 13. Section 13-8-50 states the General Assembly's findings: reasonable restrictive covenants serve legitimate purposes, and the Assembly wants parties to "be certain of the validity and enforceability of such provisions." The sections that do most of the work:

• § 13-8-51: definitions, including "key employee" (8), "material contact" (10), "modification" (11), "products or services" (13) and "professional" (14).
• § 13-8-53: what can be enforced. Subsection (a) sets the four duty tests; (b) covers customer non-solicitation; (c) says how activities and territory may be described; (d) governs modification; (e) protects confidentiality covenants.
• § 13-8-54: judicial construction, including the "may modify" language in (b).
• § 13-8-55: the person seeking enforcement must "plead and prove the existence of one or more legitimate business interests." If that person shows prima-facie compliance with § 13-8-53, the opponent has the burden of showing non-compliance or unreasonableness.
• § 13-8-56: presumptions about scope and territory, including subsection (3): "The scope of competition restricted is measured by the business of the employer."
• § 13-8-57: duration presumptions.

The four duty tests in § 13-8-53(a)

Section 13-8-53(a) allows enforcement of restrictions during the term of the relationship if they are reasonable in time, geographic area and scope. For restraints after employment ends, it says enforcement "shall not be permitted against any employee who does not, in the course of his or her employment" do at least one of these:

1. Customarily and regularly solicit customers or prospective customers for the employer.
2. Customarily and regularly make sales or obtain orders or contracts for products or services to be performed by others.
3. Have a primary duty of managing the enterprise or a customarily recognized department or subdivision, customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other employees, and have authority to hire or fire or have particular weight given to recommendations about hiring, firing, advancement or status changes.
4. Perform the duties of a key employee or of a professional.

The carve-outs matter. The test applies to restraints on competing after employment, "as distinguished from a customer nonsolicitation provision" under subsection (b) or a confidentiality provision under subsection (e).

Test 3 has three parts, and all must be met. Test 4 turns on two definitions in § 13-8-51. A key employee is someone who, through the employer's investment of time, training, money, trust or exposure to the public or customers, has gained a high level of notoriety, fame, reputation or public persona as the employer's representative, or of influence or credibility with customers, vendors or business relationships, or who is intimately involved in planning or directing the business or a defined unit. The definition's second sentence adds an employee with selective or specialized skills, learning, abilities, customer contacts or customer information obtained by working for the employer. According to the annotations to § 13-8-53, Blair v. Pantera Enterprises, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 846 (2019), held an employee must meet both sentences. We read that point in the annotation and not in the opinion.

A professional is an employee who has as a primary duty work requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction, or requiring invention, imagination, originality or talent in a recognized artistic or creative field. It excludes technician work learned through on-the-job and classroom training. An engineer or researcher fits test 4 only if the work meets that definition or the key-employee definition.

No recital is required, and the statute sets no salary threshold. Nothing in § 13-8-53 asks the covenant to name which test applies, and the section contains no compensation floor. What matters is what the employee did, and the employer should be ready to prove it along with its legitimate business interest under § 13-8-55.

Duration presumptions under § 13-8-57

Subsection (a) makes the presumptions rebuttable. Three rules apply, depending on who is bound:

Time is measured from the end of the relationship (or, in (d), from termination or disposition of the interest). Section 13-8-56(2) separately presumes a geographic territory covering the areas where the employer does business reasonable if the total distance is reasonable, the agreement lists particular competitors, or both.

A restraint longer than two years against a former employee is presumed unreasonable, so the employer must rebut the presumption. The statutory benchmark is two years. Shorter periods for particular roles are a drafting choice, not a Georgia rule. Texas takes a different route: § 15.51(c) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code says a court "shall reform" a covenant with unreasonable limitations, and bars damages before reformation. See the Texas and Florida guides.

Modification under §§ 13-8-53(d) and 13-8-54(b)

Section 13-8-54(b) says that if a court finds a restraint does not comply with § 13-8-53, "the court may modify the restraint provision and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest or interests and to achieve the original intent of the contracting parties to the extent possible." Section 13-8-53(d) adds that a court may modify a covenant "so long as the modification does not render the covenant more restrictive with regard to the employee than as originally drafted by the parties."

"Modification" is defined in § 13-8-51(11) to include "severing or removing that part of a restrictive covenant that would otherwise make the entire restrictive covenant unenforceable" and "enforcing the provisions of a restrictive covenant to the extent that the provisions are reasonable."

"May modify" is discretionary. The Court of Appeals said so in Herzig, citing Zammit v. Hobson & Hobson, 372 Ga. App. 174, 177 (2024): "Whether to modify an otherwise unenforceable restriction lies within the trial court's discretion." Compare Texas's "shall reform."

Herzig: "in any capacity"

In All States AG Parts, LLC v. Herzig, No. A24A1533 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025), the plaintiffs appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction against two former employees. The Court of Appeals found no error on either ruling. As to one employee, Herzig, his original contract had been superseded by a later offer letter with no restrictive covenants, so the injunction failed as to him.

As to the other, Rose, the court affirmed the trial court's holding that the non-compete was overbroad. It barred him from being employed by, performing services for, or associating "in any capacity" with any similar or competing business. The court cited an earlier Court of Appeals decision (later vacated on other grounds) holding that clauses that "do not list specific limits on the type of activity, and effectively bar former employees from working in any capacity for competitors" are unreasonable and overbroad.

The court then found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to blue-pencil. At the hearing the trial judge said revising it would take "a much bigger pencil than the legislature envisioned the court's having." The plaintiffs proposed striking the "in any capacity" language, but the court said that would still have forbidden Rose from "engaging in a business" similar to ASAP, "without explaining the meaning of that phrase or specifying any particular restricted activities."

Herzig applied the existing discretion in a preliminary-injunction appeal. It did not create a new rule, and the quote about the "bigger pencil" is the trial judge's remark.

Falcon Ridge: a different description survived

Falcon Ridge, Inc. v. Leon, No. A25A1333, 376 Ga. App. 554 (Ga. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2025), involved a horse stable's agreement with a trainer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the trainer, holding the non-solicitation clause unenforceable for lack of a geographic limit and the non-compete overbroad. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

On the non-compete, it held the clause "sufficiently and specifically provided a good faith estimate of the scope of the prohibited activities" under § 13-8-53(c) because it barred the trainer from "engaging in business with, owning an interest in, or acting as an officer in any competitor" within a 25-mile radius. On the non-solicit, it held that a geographic limit is not necessarily required, applying Wimmer to the non-recruitment of employees and § 13-8-53(b) to the customer non-solicit.

The clauses in Herzig and Falcon Ridge are worded differently, and the outcomes differ. Section 13-8-53(c)(1) says "any description that provides fair notice of the maximum reasonable scope of the restraint shall satisfy such requirement, even if the description is generalized or could possibly be stated more narrowly." Section 13-8-53(c)(2) offers safe-harbor phrases, such as activities "of the type conducted, authorized, offered, or provided within two years prior to termination" and "the territory where the employee is working at the time of termination," the latter sufficient if the bound person can reasonably determine the maximum scope at termination.

Wimmer and customer non-solicits

North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer, No. S23G1146, 319 Ga. 641, 906 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. Sept. 4, 2024), concerned a two-year non-recruitment covenant that barred former employees from, among other things, hiring or interfering with the employment of the employer's employees. The Georgia Supreme Court held that a restrictive covenant need not contain an express geographic term to be reasonable under § 13-8-53(a): geographic reasonableness depends on "the facts and circumstances of the case." It reversed the Court of Appeals, which had required an express term.

Customer non-solicits never needed a stated territory: § 13-8-53(b) says "No express reference to geographic area or the types of products or services considered to be competitive shall be required." They reach only customers with whom the employee had "material contact," defined in § 13-8-51(10) as customers the employee dealt with, coordinated or supervised, learned confidential information about, or whose purchases produced compensation for the employee "within two years prior to the date of the employee's termination." A § 13-8-53(b) non-solicit does not require the § 13-8-53(a) duty-test showing.

Choice of law and 2026 severance guidance

When a covenant carries a foreign choice-of-law clause, Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, 317 Ga. 206 (2023), held that a Georgia court must first apply the Georgia Act to decide whether the covenant complies, because enforcing a non-compliant covenant would violate Georgia public policy (the 2026 Burbach opinion describes the 2023 holding this way, and the annotation to § 13-8-50 says the same).

On the later appeal, Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, 378 Ga. App. 259 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2026), the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court that had voided entire employment agreements after finding the post-employment restrictions did not comply with the Act. The three-year restrictions on soliciting and on working for a competitor were moot by then because the time had passed. The court held that the agreements' severability clauses and the statutory definition of "modify" (which includes severing) meant the rest of each agreement should not have been voided, and that the confidentiality provision, governed by § 13-8-53(e), had to be analyzed separately. Section 13-8-53(e) says nothing in the Act limits how long or where a party may agree to keep information confidential "for so long as the information or material remains confidential or a trade secret."

Industry notes

Healthcare. Not verified in our October 2026 review: whether any Georgia statute outside §§ 13-8-50 to 13-8-57 restricts physician non-competes. Check the Georgia Code before relying on the general rules above for a physician agreement. For comparison, Texas enacted S.B. 1318 (89th Leg., 2025), signed June 20, 2025 and effective September 1, 2025 for covenants entered into or renewed on or after that date. For physician covenants it requires, among other things, a buyout of no more than the physician's total annual salary and wages, expiry within one year and a radius of no more than five miles (Texas Legislature Online, S.B. 1318 enrolled).

Technology. A covenant that names "the software industry" as the restricted activity describes the activity at a very high level. Section 13-8-53(c)(1) accepts generalized descriptions that give fair notice of the maximum reasonable scope, but a clause that bars any role at a competitor invites an overbreadth fight under Herzig. A specific description of the products and customer segments the employee worked on is safer.

Sales. Sales and account staff who customarily solicit customers or make sales meet § 13-8-53(a)(1) and (2) directly. The more a national template relies on "any competing business" and "any capacity," the more it resembles the language in Herzig. Peg the activity to the products and customer segments the employee worked on.

Drafting checklist

1. Know which duty test the employee meets. Be able to show, with facts, that the employee customarily solicits customers, makes sales, meets all three parts of the management test, or is a key employee or professional. No recital is required, though a short description can help.
2. Duration. Stay at two years or less for a former employee (§ 13-8-57(b)), three years or less for a franchisee, distributor, dealer, lessee or licensee (§ 13-8-57(c)). Shorter periods for particular roles are a drafting choice.
3. Activity scope. Describe the products, services and customer segments the employee worked on. Avoid "in any capacity" (Herzig). A description that gives "fair notice of the maximum reasonable scope" works under § 13-8-53(c)(1), and the phrase "of the type conducted, authorized, offered, or provided within two years prior to termination" is a statutory safe harbor.
4. Geography. Under Wimmer, an express geographic term is not required for a § 13-8-53(a) covenant, and § 13-8-53(b) customer non-solicits need none. For a non-compete, "the territory where the employee is working at the time of termination" is a statutory safe harbor if the employee can determine the maximum scope at termination.
5. Consider a customer non-solicit alongside the non-compete. A § 13-8-53(b) customer non-solicit requires "material contact" and does not depend on the § 13-8-53(a) duty tests.
6. Add severability and a modification clause. Courts keep discretion to decline modification, so do not rely on the clause to rescue an overbroad covenant. Keep confidentiality covenants in their own section, because § 13-8-53(e) treats them separately.

Multi-state employers

A single national template for Georgia employees can fail on its own terms. Georgia asks what the employee does (four duty tests), presumes duration by relationship, and gives courts a discretionary modification power. Texas's § 15.51(c) says "the court shall reform," and the Florida guide covers Florida's own rules. For how the states compare, see our non-compete enforceability by state series.

A hypothetical, without compensation figures, to show the drafting difference. A first draft bars a regional sales employee for twenty-four months from "any competing software business anywhere in the United States, in any capacity." A tightened draft covers eighteen months, the Georgia counties and nearby areas where the employee actually worked, the sale of one named product line to one customer segment, and a customer non-solicit limited to accounts with which the employee had material contact in the last two years. The tightened draft follows § 13-8-53(b) and (c) and § 13-8-57(b) more closely. Neither draft has a guaranteed outcome, and a court keeps discretion on modification.

FAQ

Are non-competes enforceable in Georgia? Yes. Under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act, effective May 11, 2011, a non-compete is enforceable if it is reasonable in time, geographic area and scope of prohibited activities, and the employee does at least one of the four things in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a): customarily solicits customers, customarily makes sales, meets the management test, or performs the duties of a key employee or professional. A restraint of two years or less on a former employee is presumed reasonable under § 13-8-57(b). The employer must plead and prove a legitimate business interest (§ 13-8-55).

How long can a non-compete last in Georgia? Under § 13-8-57, for a former employee two years or less is presumed reasonable and more than two is presumed unreasonable. For a current or former distributor, dealer, franchisee, lessee or trademark licensee, three years or less is presumed reasonable. For the owner or seller of a business, the presumption covers the longer of five years or the period during which sale payments are made. The presumptions are rebuttable.

What is the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act? It is O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 through 13-8-59, enacted in 2011 (Ga. L. 2011, p. 399). It states which restraints can be enforced, how they must be described, how courts presume reasonableness of duration and scope, who has the burden, and when courts may modify a non-compliant covenant (§§ 13-8-53(d), 13-8-54(b)).

Who can be bound by a non-compete under § 13-8-53(a)? An employee who, in the course of employment, customarily and regularly solicits customers or prospects; customarily and regularly makes sales or obtains orders or contracts; has a primary duty of managing the enterprise or a recognized department, directs two or more employees, and has hire-or-fire authority or weighty recommendations; or performs the duties of a key employee or professional. The covenant does not need to recite the category, and there is no salary threshold.

Can a Georgia court rewrite (blue-pencil) an overbroad non-compete? It may, but it does not have to. Section 13-8-54(b) says a court "may modify the restraint provision," and § 13-8-53(d) bars a modification that makes the covenant more restrictive of the employee. Modification includes severing the offending part (§ 13-8-51(11)). In All States AG Parts v. Herzig (Ga. Ct. App. 2025), the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in a refusal to rewrite an "in any capacity" clause.

Do Georgia non-solicitation agreements need a geographic limit? A customer non-solicit needs no express reference to geographic area under § 13-8-53(b). For other covenants, Wimmer (Ga. 2024) held that an express geographic term is not required, and that reasonableness depends on the facts and circumstances. Falcon Ridge (Ga. Ct. App. 2025) applied both points.

Does Georgia have a separate non-compete rule for physicians? Not verified in our October 2026 review. The sections we read, §§ 13-8-50 through 13-8-57, contain no physician-specific rule. Check the Georgia Code for any occupation-specific statute before relying on the general rules.

Did the FTC ban on non-competes change Georgia law? No. A federal court in Texas set aside the FTC's 2024 rule on August 20, 2024 (Ryan, LLC v. FTC, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024)). On September 5, 2025, the FTC voted 3 to 1 to dismiss its appeals, and a final rule removing 16 CFR part 910 took effect February 12, 2026 (91 Fed. Reg. 6507). Georgia non-competes are governed by the state statute and case law above.

For the US statutes, regulations and court rules these laws sit in, see the US primary law API.

Arshita Anand

Co-Founder & CEO · Attorney

Arshita leads product and strategy at Vaquill AI, the US primary law data API. As an attorney, she decides which law we carry, how each section is sourced and cited, and what legal AI and compliance teams need from the data.